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In Re Herbert B.: RESTITUTION 
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS 
In the case of In Re Herbert B., 303 Md. 
419, 494 A.2d 680 (1985), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
consider whether a judgment of restitution 
was proper for damages caused by a juve-
nile even though the court found as a mat-
ter of fact that the juvenile was not a de-
linquent and dismissed the matter. 
In 1982, a laundromat located in Prince 
George's County was broken into and cer-
tain property damaged. The appellant, 
sixteen-year-old Herbert B., was appre-
hended. At an adjudicatory hearing con-
ducted by the Circuit Court for Prince 
George's County, sitting as a juvenile 
court, appellant was found to have been in-
volved in storehouse breaking, petty theft, 
and destruction of private property. The 
court ordered an investigation and report 
to be completed by the Juvenile Services 
Administration, imposed court costs, and 
ordered a restitution hearing. 
A restitution hearing was held and resti-
tution in the amount of $228.50 was rec-
ommended. Later, at a disposition hearing, 
the court determined as a matter of fact 
that despite the commission of a delinquent 
act, appellant was not a delinquent child 
and therefore was not in need of treatment 
or guidance and the matter was dismissed. 
Nevertheless, the court directed appellant 
and his mother to pay $228.50 restitution 
to the owner of the laundromat. 
The issue raised on appeal was whether 
a court could enter a judgment of restitu-
tion after a case had been dismissed. The 
court of special appeals held that MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-829(a) (1984) established the necess~ry 
criteria for a judgment of restitution: first, 
that the child committed a delinquent act; 
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secondly, that the property of another was 
destroyed, stolen or damaged. Because the 
appellant satisfied these criteria, the court 
of special appeals affirmed the lower court's 
decision. See, In Re Herbert B., 58 Md. 
App. 24, 472 A.2d 95 (1984). 
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected 
appellant's argument and held that, al-
though the lower court decided that the 
child was not delinquent and that "the 
matter will stand dismissed," this was 
meant as an indication for the record that 
the child was not delinquent. Thus, the 
court was not acting upon the petition it-
self but merely determining the underly-
ing issue in the dispositional hearing. 
Additionally, appellant argued that the 
court at the dispositional hearing had to 
find him a "delinquent child" before it 
could enter a judgment of restitution un-
der Section 3-829(a). MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. (1984). The court 
rejected this contention citing section 
3-829(a). The court stated that the plain 
language of section 3-829(a) clearly did 
not require that a child be adjudicated a 
delinquent as a prerequisite for ordering 
restitution. Furthermore, section 3-829( e) 
states that a restitution hearing may be 
held "as part of" or "contemporaneously 
with" either the adjudicatory or disposi-
tional hearing. See, In Re Dan D., 57 Md. 
App. 522, 528, 470 A.2d 1318, 1321 
(1984). The court in an adjudicatory hear-
ing does not sit to determine whether a 
child is delinquent or not. Rather, the pri-
mary purpose of this particular hearing is 
to hear the merits of the allegations in 
the petition. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 3-80l(b)(1984); See, InRe 
Ernest J., 52 Md. App, 56,60,447 A.2d 
97, 100 (1982). In other words, an adjudi-
catory hearing is to determine whether the 
child committed the delinquent act alleged. 
If the court determines that the child com-
mitted the delinquent act, a separate dis-
position hearing is conducted. MD. CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(a) 
(1984). Clearly, Maryland law allows entry 
of a judgment of restitution at an adjudica-
tory hearing. Moreover, there is no statu-
tory requisite that a child be adjudged a de-
linquent prior to ordering restitution. 
Here, at the adjudicatory hearing, the 
court found that appellant had committed 
a delinquent act. At the dispositional hear-
ing, the court found that appellant was not 
a delinquent child. However, since appel-
lant was found to have committed a delin-
quent act during which he stole, damaged 
and destroyed the property of another, the 
court properly ordered restitution. 
-Marilys Fernandez 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc.: THE COURT 
REJECTS MENTAL RETARDATION 
AS A SUSPECT CLASS 
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985), 
the Supreme Court of the United States re-
cently held that mental retardation is not a 
quasi-suspect classification for equal pro-
tection clause purposes, and thus the Con-
stitution requires only that legislation re-
lating to this classification be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. Men-
tally retarded persons, because of their 
reduced capacity to function in the every-
day world, differ from other persons, and 
the states' interests in dealing with them 
and providing for them are clearly legiti-
mate ones. The Court reasoned that the 
mere "rational basis" standard of judicial 
review affords government the necessary 
latitude to both pursue policies which 
assist the retarded, and to engage in activi-
ties which burden them in an incidental 
manner. 
In July, 1980, Jan Hannah, Vice Presi-
dent and part owner of Cleburne Living 
Centers, Inc. (CLC), purchased a home 
with the intention ofleasing it to CLC. It 
was anticipated that the building would 
house 13 retarded men and women under 
the constant supervision of the CLC staff. 
The city informed CLC that a special use 
permit was required for the construction 
of"[h]ospitals for the feebleminded", and 
that the group home proposed by CLC 
should be classified as such an institution. 
After holding a public hearing on CLC's 
application, the City Council voted to 
deny the special use permit. 
CLC then filed suit in federal district 
court alleging that the zoning ordinance 
was invalid on its face and as applied be-
